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Preface

I became interested in dispositions while taking a course on Emergence. Toward the end
of that course we read a book titled Natures Metaphysics: Laws and Properties by Alexander
Bird. The notions of laws and causation have perplexed me since I first began studying
philosophy and I successfully put off any serious study of laws and causation for nearly a
decade. But with Bird’s book, I saw a vision of the universe that sparked my curiosity and
allowed me to take a stab at possibly answering the question are laws real, and what role does
causation play in accounting for nature? This thesis doesn’t not attempt to answer this questions,
however. Rather, in Bird and, later, Stephen Mumford, I discovered an interesting set of
arguments directed toward solving an apparent argumentum ad infinitum that arises when
discussing dispositions and their causal efficacy. So, Bird:
So for both Armstrong and Lewis the possession of specific properties by things
is entirely consistent with there being no laws that govern those properties. But
what then differentiates the properties from one another? Such a world is
allegedly full of things with different properties, but no thing is causing any other
thing to happen. […] Such a world seemed to me hardly to be a genuine
possibility. But at the time, the accounts of law provided by Lewis and Armstrong
were the two principle contenders in the field. There was something wrong with
both, in the divorce between what properties are and what properties do. The
behaviour, or rather the tendency towards certain patters of behaviour, should be
built into the properties …1
Given such an account that the properties of things themselves should have a causal role in the
metaphysics of nature brings with it a very special set of problems. If, on the one hand, some
viii

property, P1, is the cause of another property, P2, and P2 is a further cause for property, P3, and so
on P1 … Pn, then a genuine case of an infinite regress arises. On the other hand, if property Pn
becomes a cause for the original property P1, then there is a case of circularity. Neither case
seems satisfactory.
The point of dispositionalism is to give an account of nature in terms of relational
properties, i.e., dispositions, that captures objects’ tendencies toward certain behaviors. This is
not simply a metaphysical account of things; it is a way of looking at the world in a way that
relates to the way that we seem to experience it. This is a rare combination. But this intuition that
our metaphysics and epistemology are or should be concomitant with each other is too striking of
an idea to simply let go. The behaviorists hit on this idea and used it to its fullest extent until its
spectacular fall in the 1960s. The behaviorists wanted to give an account of things by translating
our language of mentality, e.g., belief, desire, hope, think, etc. – the so called propositional
attitudes, into behaviorist language. Thus being hungry (a mental state) would have been
translated into ‘being disposed to eat while in the presence of food.’ This avoided the problem of
interaction that comes from talking about the mind (nonextended substance) causally influencing
the body (extended substance) while at the same time giving an account of how some states of
affairs of the world interact with other states of affairs. The added advantage was that not only
was the mind/body problem seemingly bypassed but the behaviorist account of things fit nicely
with the very real way that we experience the world by tracking patterns of behavior.
This idea of relational properties is, of course, not new. John Duns Scotus gives just such
an account in his discussion of time. As Turetzky puts it, “Potential time exists even in the
absence of any movement at all. Were nature to exist without actual change, Scotus avers, it still
would have the potential to act in definite ways.”2 In other words, part of what characterizes the
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natural world is that it tends to behave in regular ways, but it need not actually do anything; it
only need to be able to behave in such and such way. Thus what is doing the work in nature is
the potential to change. This seems to be a very early account of what we would call today
dispositionalism. Things are what they are in virtue of their dispositional character: a rubber
band is a rubber band because it is disposed to stretch when pulled, but it need not actually be
pulled in order to have the disposition of elasticity. Likewise, for Scotus the world is disposed
toward various behaviors, in this case, change. By appealing to nature’s potential to act – to
change – Scotus is positing a way to explain change; after all, things that undergo change must
have the potential to change elsewise change would be inexplicable. And so Scotus attempts to
give not just a metaphysical view of change, but, I think, plays into the very common sense
epistemological notion we have that things that cannot change don’t; things change if for no
other reason than because they are capable of changing.
This idea of potential change comes from Scotus’ discussion of place and movement and
Scotus’ notion of haecceitas. First, when referring to an object, there is a ‘thisness’ about the
object. For example, if I point to the pan on my stove and say “this pan” what I am referring to is
that object’s ‘panness’ – that something about the pan that individuates it from the seeming
identical pan on the stove next to it, or the pan in the lower cabinet, or the pan that my neighbor
has. What individuates that pan is its haecceity, in other words. Further, the nature of the pan and
its haecceity are inseparable; the pan’s ‘panness’ and the physical nature of the pan are
inextricable linked. In fact, this distinction is not a real one but, rather, a distinctio formalis a
parte rei – a formal objective distinction made by the intellect. In other words, there are no
universal essences apart from the existence of the objects. This is so because if there were some
universal essence that the pan participated in, then it would be impossible, even meaningless, to
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talk of individual pans or any other object for that matter since they would all share the same
nature – this pan and that pan would be essentially the same. Therefore, although form and
matter are separable (since one matter can take different forms), a thing is what it is due to its
physical nature and haecceity, or individuating principle.3
Now,4 when bodies and their parts are taken together, Scotus notices the loci (place) and
ubi (the location within place). We can think in terms of containers, here. A container, e.g., the
universe, implies that something is contained – something’s ubi; the container is the place in
which things are located – the ubi’s loci. Concerning the organization of the part of the whole,
Scotus posits the positio (translated in Duhem as “disposition”). According to Duhem, the
disposition refers to the order of the parts of the body, say, all of the planets within the universe,
in relation to the different positions of the place. Concerning movement of bodies we finally
come to an account of time that seems strikingly similar to our account of dispositions. Scotus
writes, “Even if no movement existed, there can still exist a rest, properly speaking; in fact, even
if no body is in movement, a body can always behave in the same fashion, while being naturally
capable of behaving in one fashion or another.”5 What Scotus is talking about here is the
potential of bodies to move and rest. Whether a body is at rest or in movement indicates only an
actual state of affairs (what we will be calling a manifestation of a disposition). What is
important for Scotus, it seems, is that an object be able to move or be at rest, do this or do that. It
is difficult not to see this account as a dispositional one. This is, of course, a brief account of
Scotus’ notion of time and potentiality. Nevertheless, the point here was to show not just the
similarity between the accounts, but to point out that a dispositional account of nature seems to
be an important metaphysical problem to flesh out.

xi

Most recently David Armstrong and David Lewis have argued for different versions of
what dispositions are. This is not the place for a discussion of their arguments. What is
important, however, is what they agree on. For both Armstrong and Lewis dispositions are
categorical as opposed to essential. The difference can be put as follows. If properties such as
fragility and elasticity are essentially dispositional, then those properties exist regardless of
whether fragility or elasticity manifest, are instantiated. And when fragility or elasticity do
manifest, they do so out of necessity; that is, there is a causal connection between a stimulus, the
disposition, and the manifestation of the disposition. This is not the case if a disposition is
categorical (henceforth categoricalism). Bird:
Properties are categorical in the following sense: they have no essential or other
non-trivial modal character. For example, and in particular, properties do not,
essentially or necessarily, have or confer any dispositional character or power.
Being made of rubber confers elasticity on an object, but it does not do so
necessarily. Being negatively charged confers on objects the power to repel other
negatively charged objects, but not necessarily. In other possible worlds rubber
objects are not elastic, negatively charged objects attract rather than repel one
another. The essential properties of a natural property are limited to its essentially
being itself and not some distinct property.6
For a dispositionalist the disposition fragility is autonomous and universal. An object is
essentially dispositional if it participates in the following (causal) subjunctive conditional
structure: an object is disposed to break if, when the appropriate stimulus is applied, it breaks.
And, barring masks or mimics (see Section I), this would hold in any possible world – fragility is
conferred necessarily. For a categoricalist fragility is an internal property of an object and is not
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necessary: in some states of affairs, glass confers fragility and in others rigidity; in some states of
affairs, rubber confers elasticity and in others brightness. Is such cases, dispositions are
contingent and owe their character and existence to an object’s internal structure, e.g., an object’s
molecular structure, states of affairs of the world, or what have you.
The problem with essential dispositions as Armstrong and Lewis see it is the threat of
circularity and regress as mentioned above. In what follows, I wish to present a narrow
discussion of Bird’s and Mumford’s basic positions on their versions of dispositionalism. I think
that they are correct to point to the threat of circularity and regress but I do not believe that they
have successfully argued away the problem. I begin by offering a very brief account of
dispositions and three general criticisms. The goal is to show that causation is central to a
satisfactory account of dispositionalism. Next, I outline Mumford’s and then Bird’s general
positions on dispositions. What this will show is the importance of the regress/circularity
objection. Both philosophers understand the importance of the regress/circularity objection in
talk of dispositions and do their best to answer it. Mumford’s answer to the regress/circularity
objection rests on everyday knowledge of the world. Bird’s answer depends on an argument for
supervenience. My claim is that neither succeeds. I conclude by reiterating that for an account of
dispositions to be meaningful one must successfully answer the regress/circularity objection.
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Major Section – I
In a recent article,7 Stephen Mumford argues for a position called “pandispositionalism.”8
His aim is to give an account as to the nature and structure of causation in terms of powers or
dispositions.9 Specifically, Mumford wishes to argue that powers are causes of their
manifestations – a cause is a manifestation of power and, thus, that causation is a universal that is
instantiated when a power is manifested. Nevertheless, even when a power is manifested, it is
neither a necessary nor contingent fact that the manifestation exist. As such, a proper account of
causation must include “bundles of powers” whereby more than one power “contributes” to the
manifestation of power. And though according to Armstrong and others, this leads to the passing
around of powers from which obvious problems of circularity and ad infinitum regress arise,
Mumford sees this as an attractive character for a dispositional account of causation and, in fact,
he sees this as support that the identity of powers can only be determined in relation to its place
in a complex structure (of powers).
Alexander Bird10 also holds that the identity of properties are determined not just by their
relation to other properties, but to the relationships of manifestations, or manifestation relations,
between properties and other properties. (This will be discussed below, especially in section IV.)
Bird, however, sees the constraint that, elsewhere11 Mumford’s metaphysics does not allow the
possibility for laws of nature as too strong and claims that he has not “done enough” to warrant
the adoption of a lawless metaphysics of dispositions. Mumford’s idea is that given that laws are
supposed to govern the regularities of nature and since powers, i.e., dispositions, are doing all of
the (causal) work, laws are not a necessary component of the metaphysics of nature. Rather, Bird
argues that laws do not necessarily have to govern, i.e., do any causal work, and that laws do
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supervene on potencies, but, rather than serving a governance role over them, are derived from
them. Thus Bird suggests a lawful, relational metaphysics of nature.
I begin by offering a very brief account of dispositions and three general criticisms. The
goal is to show that causation is central to a satisfactory account of dispositionalism. Next, I
outline Mumford’s and then Bird’s general positions on dispositions. Although this discussion
includes talk of laws in nature, this will not be the focus of this paper. Here, talk of laws is meant
to give a broader understanding of what is at stake in talk of dispositions and is a way to focus
attention on what dispositions do. What I wish to show is the importance of giving a robust
account of circularity/regress in dispositionalism. Both philosophers understand this importance
and do their best to answer the challenge of circularity/regress. Thus, since my focus is
specifically with the nature of circularity/regress in talk of dispositions, I will not need to address
the issue of whether laws in nature are real.
Mumford’s answer to the circularity/regress objection rests on everyday knowledge of
the world and is, thus, epistemic. I will argue that Mumford’s position is unsatisfactory based on
the reasoning that if one is looking to give a metaphysical account of nature, that account cannot
be based on epistemological grounds since epistemic claims can’t tell us what is there in the
world. Bird’s answer is metaphysical and rests on a supervenience claim. I will argue that Bird’s
response to circularity/regress is likewise unsatisfactory since supervenience claims are not
explanatory. I conclude by reiterating that for an account of dispositions to be meaningful one
must successfully answer the circularity/regress objection.
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Major Section – II
Are dispositions real? If so, what do they do? How is it, for example, that what is
essential for that rubber band is its disposition toward elasticity even if it never manifests? One
analysis of dispositions deals with counterfactual analysis. If the counter factual conditional
COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS if the rubber band does not manifest
elasticity when stretched, then the rubber band does not have the disposition of
elasticity
is true, then it seems that the conditional
CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS if a rubber band is elastic, then it will stretch when
pulled
must be true. As it turns out, though, this is not the case since dispositions can be masked or
mimicked by any number of conditions that either don’t let a disposition manifest, e.g., an
antidote to a poison, or that mimic the supposed causal relationship between stimulus and
disposition manifestation, e.g., the glass appeared to break when struck, but what really
happened was that the microphysical structure of the glass deteriorated coincidently at the same
time it was struck thus giving the appearance that it was the striking that caused the
manifestation.12 So what do dispositions do, especially in cases involving masks and mimics?
We might reason as follows. To do something an entity must be real. To be real is to have
causal influence. To do something, then, is to cause (or be caused). A fire that didn’t do
anything, e.g., heat, boil water, ignite various materials, would hardly count as being real. I’ll
take the foregoing as assumptions. I point out only that it seems that if dispositions did not do
anything, then it would be pointless to talk about them.13
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It is standard to talk of dispositions as participating in the causal push and pull of the
world; but it is also standard to talk of dispositions as not needing to be manifested in order to be
real. If conditional and counterfactual analyses fail to account for this, we might look to
supervenience. If supervenience is taken to mean
SUPERVENIENCE if object o has property P, then for any microphysically
identical duplicates o1 … on, then o1 … on would also have property P,
then we would identify the glass’ disposition to be fragile with its microphysical structure and
likewise for other instances of fragility. This is nothing less than a categoricalist position.
Although categoricalist arguments do not to my knowledge expressly argue for supervenience,
supervenience claims share with categoricalism the reliance on the internal structure of an object
to attain its identity. Assume, for example, that some statue S is beautiful. If a microphysical
duplicate of S was made, say, S*, then if S is beautiful, then S* would be beautiful as well since
what conferred beauty upon S is the same thing that would confer beauty upon S*, namely its
microphysical structure. This would, however, only defeat the purpose of dispositions talk since
what is doing the work is the physical structure of the glass and the statue.
The focus lay in the relationship between an unmanifested disposition and its
manifestation. Barring masks and mimics, we notice that for a glass to break it must have the
disposition to break. Things that aren’t fragile don’t break. It further seems that there must be a
relationship between the stimulus, disposition, and manifestation (S-D-M). So, when the glass
breaks, it does so because some stimulus was introduced, the disposition (fragility) manifested,
and, therefore, the disposition must have been there – it is real. This might lead us to conclude
that what is being discussed is not just the S-D-M relation, but the causal interaction (if any)
between the stimulus and disposition which results in the manifestation of the disposition.
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There are three problems with this interactionist position. First, one only shifts the
location of the cause from a disposition to the interaction and only delays an explanation.
Second, one introduces another element that needs to be explained aside from the disposition.
And, finally, one defeats the purpose of talking about dispositions if one talks in terms of
interaction doing the causal work. The point of having a view of disposition is to say that they
are metaphysically primitive. If we take the foregoing seriously, then there is good reason to
think that an account of dispositions will have to have an account of causation.
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Major Section – III
Mumford accounts for causation in terms of powers, specifically, bundles of powers. In
doing so, he wishes to give an account that offers insight into the structure and nature of
causation. Powers are for an effect; they are for something. The power for fragility manifests
when the vase shatters; the power for the fire to warm bodies manifests when a body is warmed
by the fire. However, even when powers do manifest, it is not out of necessity since something
could have prevented the manifestation. The vase could have been caught before it hit the ground
or, perhaps, not shattered when it did hit the ground. A body could be too far for the fire to
warm, or there could be an obstruction between the fire and the body. Thus, “powers do not
necessitate their manifestations.” Yet, neither are powers contingent since they are for
something. To be real, then, according to Mumford, is to be powerful. Under this view,
properties are bundles of powers and are real since powers tend toward their manifestation. As
Mumford sees it, “Powers bring to the world an irreducible sui generis variety of modality that I
think is at the heart of our causal thinking. The modal force of a power is neither entirely
necessary nor entirely contingent but something in between and which cannot be analysed away
in non-power terms …”14 In this sense, powers are primitive and are for some effect. The power
of fragility, for example, is for the breaking of the glass, and so on.
There are three main objections to a dispositional account of causation as Mumford sees
it.15 Notice that when fragility manifests, the glass of the vase no longer has the disposition of
fragility; neither does it have the disposition to hold water, nor any other disposition that a vase
would have. But the pieces that were once the vase now have powers: to cut, to be carried in a
pocket, used as art, etc … This is the so-called “shifting potencies objection.”
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“The first version of the shifting potencies objection,” writes Mumford, “is that this is an
unsatisfactory view of causation. Every power is a power for a further power, and so on.
Armstrong certainly thinks this a difficulty, saying that ‘Causality becomes the mere passing
around of powers from particulars to further particulars’.” The objection is that if a disposition is
a disposition for other dispositions, then the explanation is an ad infinitum regress. Mumford
does not see this as a problem, though. Rather, the redistribution of powers is attractive because
1) it captures our everyday observations of the world, and 2) it captures our theoretical notions
about the way the world is. For instance, we notice that when a fire warms a body, that body now
has the ability to warm other bodies; a computer infected with a virus has the ability to infect
other computers; and so on. This is a real feature of the world that the passing around of powers
thesis captures. Assuming a causally closed universe, things just get shuffled around which,
again, is what the passing around of powers thesis claims.
But this leads to a second criticism. If the manifestations of powers are nothing more than
the manifestation of potency, then only potencies get passed around and, thus, “the world never
passes from potency to act … nothing ever happens.”16 As Mumford points out, though, it is not
that causation gets passed around, but possibilities and, indeed, if that were the case the criticism
might hold because the passing around of possibilities is meaningless. But for Mumford, the
passing around (of whatever) is an event or events and are as real a phenomena as one could
want. The assumption, Mumford points out, is that potencies are “nothing real, nothing actual”.
But, according to Mumford, the passing around is an event and events, since they are as real a
phenomena as one could wish, are certainly something:
But by potency, a dispositionalist does not mean a mere possibility that becomes
real only in its manifestation or act. By a potency, a powers theorist means a real
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potentiality and thinks that Armstrong is wrong to say that these are not real. The
dispositionalist takes them to be real in their own right, so they do not require to
be actualized in their manifestations in order to themselves attain actuality. […]
What more is there needed to be real than to be potent? How could something be
potent without being real? How could it have power?17
When the dispositionalist talks about the passing around of powers, she does not mean the
passing around of possibilities but of real potentialities.
The last objection stems from the perceived regress in dispositional accounts: A is a
disposition for B, and B for C, and C for D, and so on. If this is so, then, as the objection has it,
either we end up back where we started (circularity), or there is a true infinite regress. Though
this is not clearly shown in either Bird or Mumford, the objection is that we can never specify
dispositions because we can’t know what a disposition is a disposition for. “This is indeed a
problem,” says Mumford, “but what it shows … is that properties are indeed interrelated. The
nature and identity of a property cannot be determined alone … but is determined by its place in
a complex structurally related whole.” The supposed circularity is acceptable since “We
experience powers acting upon ourselves and we also sometimes exercise our own powers. This
gives us a starting point in terms of which other powers become meaningful to us.” Our
experience of powers gives us a way into the circle; our everyday understanding of the way the
world works is our starting point for understanding what powers do. If an account of nature is
going to be given in terms of disposition, then we must be able to talk about them in terms of
being real – being causally influential. As Mumford sees it, talk of dispositions is talk of
causation.

8

Major Section – IV
Bird and Mumford are on par with each other as far as the disposition-manifestation
relation goes: talk of dispositions is talk of causation and the world is essentially dispositional.
To paraphrase Bird,18 if what we are looking for in discussing causation is a reduction of
causation to simpler terms, then as we saw, CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS simply won’t work. A
dispositional analysis, thus, seems trivial. But for Bird, the insight that a dispositional analysis
gives us is that causation is the S-D-M relation and is, therefore, irreducible and unanlyzable to a
further concept.
Consider Bird’s example. SPELL is a law that says the first SPELL cast on a given day is
enacted at 2400 hrs. At 1200 Merlin casts a SPELL to turn the prince into a frog and at 1800
Morgana casts a SPELL also to turn the prince into a frog. At 2400 the prince becomes a frog.
There is nothing in the law that lets one distinguish between Merlin’s and Morgana’s SPELL.
COUNTERFACTUAL ANALYSIS fails since “it is false that had Merlin not cast his SPELL,
the prince would not have become a frog (since Morgana’s SPELL would have done the job).”
Finally, what SPELL shows is a manifestation of a disposition without any true causation. Again,
a metaphysics of dispositions seems bound to fail since there seems to be nothing actual
happening.
We can understand this last point in more concrete and familiar terms. COFFEE POT is a
law that says that at 2400 on a given day the coffee pot will brew a pot of coffee given the proper
stimulus. At 1200 Merlin pulls a lever which is known to activate the coffee pot. At 1800
Morgana pulls an adjacent lever known to activate the same coffee pot. At 2400 the coffee pot
begins brewing. And as in the case of SPELL above one cannot tell which lever activated the
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coffee pot for either one would have done the job. Now if it is said that the levers were disposed
to start the coffee pot, then it is unclear which disposition is causally influencing the coffee pot.
Bird points out, though, that in the case of SPELL the disposition to turn the prince into a
frog might be a property of the person reciting the SPELL as well as a property belonging to the
prince of being turned into a frog. Both are possible. What Bird thinks is important about this is
that:
…there is a difference between in fact being the manifestation-token of that
disposition-token and merely being an event of the manifestation-type in terms of
counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Likewise, there is a difference between
a disposition being manifested in response to this stimulus-token rather than that
stimulus-token, so that only one really stimulates the disposition. … SPELL
shows that we cannot account for such differences in terms of counterfactual or
subjunctive conditionals. The conclusion we must draw … is that the relation ‘Mx
is the manifestation of disposition Dx in response to stimulus Sx’ is ontologically
basic and is not reducible.19
Thus, causation is the “stimulation and manifestation of a disposition.” Bird’s analysis of
dispositions is relational. And where in Mumford’s metaphysics dispositions themselves are
primitive, Bird holds the S-D-M relation as primitive.20 What is important here is Bird’s
identification of causation with the S-D-M relation. But this is going to cause a problem for Bird
in terms of the governing role that laws play in the fundamental metaphysics of nature, as we
will see below.
Objecting to Mumford’s lawless metaphysics, Bird asks that we consider Mumford’s
disjunctive argument.21 If laws really existed, then they would do something, i.e., they would
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play a genuine governing role in nature. But if they do govern, then they are either external to the
properties they govern or they are internal to them. On the one hand, if one accepts that laws are
external to the properties they govern, then one is committed to quidditism (or categorical
monism). Quidditism is the view that whatever properties turn out to be, i.e., whether or not they
turn out to be causally powerful, confer identity upon an object, etc …, those properties of
objects are contingent. In other words, if object o has property P in possible world W1, then this
is so only contingently; object o might have property P* or property M or no property at all in
world W2. If this is the case, then it is unclear not only what role that properties would play in
nature, but also whether or not we could even, in principle, identify them. Quidditism fails, then,
due to this unusually robust form of skepticism. As Bird points out:
Lewis accepts and indeed argues for the thesis that quidditism entails Humility,
where Humility is the claim that we cannot know about the fundamental
properties of nature. Lewis may have been content to accept both quidditism and
Humility. But this skeptical consequence of Humility is, I suggest, a very high
price to pay for the Humean metaphysic.
We do not want our metaphysics of properties to condemn us to a
necessary ignorance of them.22
On the other hand, if one accepts that laws are internal to the properties they govern, then one
must be able to give an explanation of how it is that “something that is internal to properties and
kinds can govern them.” The inconsistency comes from the seeming self-referential nature of
such an explanation. If, for example, laws govern properties and properties are intrinsic to
objects, then it would seem that to reference a law would amount to the same thing as reference
to the property to which the law governs and to reference a property would simply be to
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reference the law that the property is governed by. Put another way: if both laws and properties
are intrinsic to objects, then there would appear to be no way to know which one one would be
referring to – if laws and properties are intrinsic, then our epistemic access to nature is blocked.
Such an explanation, therefore, cannot be given. We are thus committed to the second disjunct of
the argument, namely, that laws do not govern.
Bird motivates his objection to Mumford with the following:
Mumford’s argument is particularly pressing since he and I largely agree on
nature’s underlying metaphysics … the existence and nature of essentially
dispositional properties. Mumford’s view is that the efficacy of potencies in this
regard shows that laws are otiose. I instead regard potencies as explaining what
laws are. Mumford think[s] that potencies eliminate laws since they usurp the role
laws were supposed to fill. … laws are supposed to explain the existence of
regularities and so forth. But if potencies do this, then we may eliminate laws.23
Bird thinks that Mumford has not done enough to show that a realist view of laws concerning
“modally laden properties” is inconsistent. In particular, Mumford’s primary assumption is that
laws actually fill a governing role. This isn’t the case according to Bird. Our injunction that laws
govern stems from misconceived ideas about explanation and a weak analogy to legal notions of
laws. For instance, for some set, S, in the universe S exists because there are laws. Thus, the best
explanation for S is the existence of laws. This is so because, as the thinking goes, if one is a
realist about laws, then laws should do something (play some governing role) in the world. This
view commits one to the thesis that “laws explain their instances,” i.e., that laws have a
legitimate explanatory function. But if one accepts this view, then one could just as well accept
the thesis that potencies (dispositions/powers) govern. For:
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1. The world contains S (premise);
2. If there are potencies, then laws supervene on them (premise);
3. The best explanation of S is that there are potencies (premise);
4. There are potencies (from (1) and (3));
5. There are laws (from (2) and (4)).24

So, this argument may commit one to the view that potencies also govern without accepting that
laws govern since the potencies are obviously doing the work. In any case:
Even if we permit ourselves a metaphysics of governance, we may be able to
acquiesce to (VI)25 without accepting that laws govern. For example, let Ys
supervene on Xs. If any change in Xs yield a significant difference in the world,
then a change in Ys will also yield a significant difference in the world (since a
change in Ys must involve a change in Xs). Now imagine that Xs ‘govern’ the
world and Ys supervene on Xs. We could identify Ys with the laws and (VI) would
still be true. In this set-up Xs govern the world; would one want to say that the
supervening Ys also govern the world? It is far from clear that one would …”26
So, for Bird, then, laws may still supervene on the world but in a non-governing way. His proof
is as follows. Imagine that F does not supervene on G, but it nevertheless determines it. Now
take the (mereological) sum of F and G. In this case, F does supervene on G and partly
determines the sum. Thus, according to Bird, the particular dispositions do the governing and
laws do the supervening, and Mumford’s claim that there can be no real laws is resisted.27
The point here has been to suggest what is at stake regarding a discussion of dispositions.
On the one hand, laws of nature are invoked all of the time as having some sort of causal efficacy
in the world. Newton’s Law of Universal Gravity holds that F=Gm1m2/d2 where the gravitational
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constant G can be measured by dividing the mass of one object time the mass of another object
by the distance squared between them. Laws of biological inheritance explain the diversity of life
on Earth. Laws of electromagnetism explain why magnets attract as well as certain perturbations
in the atmosphere. On the other hand, if the story about dispositions (that they are causally
powerful) is correct, then our understanding of the world would seem to be in need of a serious
overhaul – explanations of the world might come in the form of dispositions rather than referring
to laws.
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Major Section – V
Bird doesn’t give a robust account of what he means by “govern” in terms of laws. For properties
to govern, Bird would say that properties have to do something – our familiar mantra thus far.
Properties are real and present even when the properties are not manifested. A vase is fragile
whether or not it ever breaks. For Bird a manifestation relation is the relation that holds between
a property and the manifestation of the property28 – it is the relation that holds between the vase
(the object) and the property of fragility. But the shattered vase is nothing but pieces of glass or
whatever. As will be show in greater detail below, it is the case for Bird that the S-D-M relation
is a supervenient relationship and laws are real for Bird in the sense that they participate in the
causal push and pull of the world. Again, this will be come much clearer in the following section.
However, consider for a moment an initial argument for a supervenient relationship between
objects and properties (or laws).
Mumford claims that laws are otiose because dispositions do all of the work. But Bird
seems to be pointing to an explanation as to why laws do whatever they do. We could identify
Bird’s manifestation relations as laws of nature because if the S-D-M relation were to supervene
on objects or properties then they would seem to play a governing role from a metaphysical
standpoint. And this seems so because if there were a change in the S-D-M relation, then there
would be a change in the world. Thus, if the S-D-M relation does supervene, then it does so in a
metaphysically governing manner. It might, then, be the case that we could conceive of laws as
those second-order relational properties (manifestation relations) that supervene on the regular
operation of the elements of some system, i.e., nature, where if any element of that system
(properties, manifestation relations, objects) changed, then the system would change. Laws in
this sense would play a part in the governance of the natural world while not holding complete
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causal hegemony over it since nature can change, but, nevertheless, allowing for our
metaphysical intuitions about regularities in nature. And, in fact, this is exactly what Bird does.
But as will be shown below, this account is doomed to fail because of the failure of
supervenience as a satisfactory explanation of the world.
It was pointed out in an earlier section that Mumford addresses the regress/circularity
objection. Mumford’s answer is that circularity is acceptable since we have epistemic access into
the circle; talk of dispositions captures not just our theoretical conceptions about the world, but
also our everyday experience of the way the world is. My everyday intuitions about the causal
influences of, say, fire, i.e, that fire can burn a house down or cook a steak, are not wrong and
my experience of this world only augments support for these intuitions. Nevertheless, it just
seems bad reasoning to use our intuitions about the way the world is to qualify our scientific
(either physical or metaphysical) claims. While I may not have reason to doubt that the fire is
real, I could nevertheless be wrong. If our way into the metaphysical circle of dispositions is
epistemic, then we are treading a narrow entrance if indeed it is one.
The other problem I see with Mumford’s assessment of the acceptability of circularity is
that it is exceedingly ad hoc. In his Laws in Nature,29 Mumford goes to great lengths to argue for
the important role that metaphysics plays in our understanding of nature (and the laws of nature
in particular). So, for instance, Mumford argues:30 1) scientific revolutions periodically change
our understanding of the physical world and how to proceed doing science. It is the case,
therefore, that empirical science gives us no more indubitable results than does metaphysics; 2)
“Even in credible theories of science … it is by no means obvious … that the ideas of laws of
nature is better understood in science than it is in metaphysics.” Questions of what laws do are
themselves philosophical questions. An understanding of science is incomplete without
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philosophical investigation; and 3) if science is the study of the empirical and metaphysics the
more general study of what exists, then science cannot tell us whether laws exist whereas
metaphysics can. Mumford concludes, therefore, that metaphysics is indispensable to proper
science.
Considering his argument for the indispensability of metaphysics, I find it troubling that,
when doing metaphysics, Mumford abdicates metaphysical explanation favoring epistemological
explanation. My feeling is that this is due to the intractable problem of logical circularity. If, qua
philosopher, one is after truth through reasoning and the presentation and refutation of valid
arguments, then to accept circularity or regress is an absurdity. It only seems natural that one
would make an appeal to one’s everyday experience of the world to support one’s claims. When
one is running out of explanations, if appeal to epistemological explanation is the last hand that
one has, then that is the hand that one plays. But unless we risk confusing epistemology with
metaphysics, then we should conclude Mumford’s appeal to everyday experience as
unacceptable.
The problem of circularity/regress is not just Mumford’s problem, though. Bird must also
contend with the regress/circularity objection. Here is Bird’s presentation of the
regress/circularity objection:
I shall follow Aristotle in taking the essence of an entity to be that whereby a
thing is what it is (Metaph., VII, 7). Thus we should expect the essence of a
property, its dispositional character if it is an essentially dispositional property, to
determine the identity of the property. According to the dispositional essentialist
therefore, the essence of such a property is determined by its relations to other
properties. And … if one is a dispositional monist then those other properties also
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have dispositional essences. Consequently the identity of any property is
determined by its relations to other properties. Hence, either there is an infinity of
properties or there is circularity in this relationship of identities.31

The problem is that Bird switches from talk of causation to talk of identity and later to talk of
supervenience. As he sees it the regress/circularity objection in its most important form is
couched in terms of identity rather than causation: “the focus on identity does raise what I take to
be the fourth and most important version of the circularity objection …”32 My initial objection,
then, will be to say that resisting the regress/circularity objection in terms of identity still leaves
the dispositionalist helpless in addressing causation – one must still resist causal circularity; and
if, as noted earlier and as Mumford points out, if dispositions are for something, then they must
at least be disposed to tend toward their manifestation – they must have causal influence. Fixing
identity does not fix an entity’s causal powers.
The problem, as Bird sees it, stems from Aristotle’s idea that essences fix identity. Bird
continues, “If essences fix identity, as Aristotle says, then the identity of a property is
determinate only if the properties to which its essence relates it themselves have determinate
identity. And that is just what is ruled out by circularity.”33 The problem for the dispositionalist
is that the essence of dispositions is relational. As we saw in the section above, dispositions are
characterized in terms of the S-D-M relation. But if a disposition’s essence depends relationally
on another disposition, and that disposition depends relationally on another, then circularity
ensues in which case one can never say what a disposition is a disposition for; or, in other words,
one can never identify a disposition. Aristotle, it seems, must be correct at least in terms of there
being some determinate identity upon which all other identities can be determined and Bird is
right to take the objection seriously.
18

His response comes in graph theoretical terms. A graph is considered to be a non-trivial
automorphism if, when rotated 180°, the structure remains unchanged, but some vertices map
onto other vertices. This means that the structure of the graph does not determine the identity of
the individual vertices since two different vertices occupy the same space (though at two
different times) after consecutive rotations. Vertex a rotates to vertex c’s position, vertex b
rotates to vertex d’s position, and c’s to a’s, and d’s to b’s. By virtue of their location on the
graph, vertex a is indistinguishable from vertex c and, thus, identity cannot be determined by the
structure of a non-trivial automorphic graph. An asymmetric graph, on the other hand, is a graph
whereby, when rotated, the structure remains, but so do the identities of the vertices since no
vertex is ever mapped onto any other vertex and, hence, the structure of the graph determines the
identity of the vertices.
Bird concludes the following. Using graphs is a way to represent the S-D-M relation and
in so doing it becomes clear that as the identity of the vertices supervenes on each iteration of an
asymmetric graph, so does the identity of dispositions and the S-D-M relation supervene on the
manifestations of the dispositions. Thus even though the argument for dispositionalism is
circular, it can nevertheless be accounted for:
For the dispositional monist identity of properties is dependent on something else,
rather than being primitive34 … The something else is the pattern of manifestation
relations. The question may be phrased then, Can the identity of potencies
supervene on the pattern of their manifestation relations? The answer is that it
can. If we represent the manifestation relation by edges of a graph and the
potencies by its vertices […] Nonetheless … it remains the case that there are
graphs that represent possible structures of pure potencies that have the property
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that the identity and distinctness of the vertices supervene on the structure of
manifestation and stimulus relations. We may confidently conclude therefore that
the regress objection can be answered.35

I do not believe that Bird has succeeded. I believe this for two reasons. The first has to do
with the explanatory role of supervenience. Anybody familiar with supervenience will admit that
supervenience claims are not themselves any sort of explanation. At best they are claims that
some higher-order properties covary with some physical state of affairs in the world without
being physically reduced to those states of affairs; in Jaegwon Kim’s words, “mind-body
supervenience itself is not an explanatory theory; it merely states a pattern of property
covariation between the mental and the physical and points to the existence of a dependency
relation between the two. Yet supervenience is silent on the nature of the dependence relation
that might explain why the mental supervenes on the physical.”36
Bird presents a sophisticated argument in support of the supervenience relationship. But
then again, one could be a näive realist and come to the same conclusion – that objects in the
world form my experience of it and, furthermore, my experience of those objects leads me to the
fact that my identity, in some sense, is dependent upon where I happen to be, i.e., I am
individuated by the fact that I don’t share the exact location in space and time with my neighbor,
or the tree, or any other object. But this is, after all, Bird’s conclusion – structure determines
identity. But, as Kim noted, the work that needs to be done is to show what that dependency
relation is. Bird doesn’t do this since the supervenience thesis is nonexplanatory.
Furthermore, what I think is at issue here is that even if the supervenience argument
succeeded, the supervenience relation is not a causal relation. Thus, proving supervenience does
not prove causation. But, as I claimed earlier, if being real depends on participating in causal
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relationships, and if supervenience (even if true) does not entail causation, then proving
supervenience relationships does not prove that the entities that stand within the supervenience
relationship are real. This, however, runs contrary to what Bird wants to do in the first place.
Recall from an earlier section that Bird identifies causation with the S-D-M relation. He
generalizes that “We know … what causation is – it is the stimulation and manifestation of a
disposition.”37 In other words, a dispositional analysis is not a conceptual analysis but is a
“substantive metaphysical thesis. In which case the appearance of modal concepts such as
‘cause’ in the analysis of ‘disposition’ may not be so worrying.”38 But, of course, as we just saw,
Bird identifies talk of disposition with talk of causation. And what this means in the end is that
Bird has delayed an explanation of circular causation and the regress/circularity objection goes
unanswered.
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Major Section – VI
What I have hoped to show is that Stephen Mumford and Alexander Bird have not given a
successful account of circularity. It is my claim that until the regress/circularity objection is
answered, there can be little conceptual or metaphysical progress for talk of dispositions. A
dispositional account of things may well be circular and Mumford’s and Bird’s intuitions about
circularity not being an issue are interesting and need to be further explored. But their arguments
do not work. The new direction for dispositions should focus on the nature of circularity and the
role that it plays in a causally closed universe.
What such an account of circularity would look like, however, I am unsure of. There are
some promising leads, though. Remember that for both Bird and Mumford, especially Mumford,
a metaphysics of dispositions is supposed to capture not just our theoretical notions of the
universe, but our everyday experience of the universe as well. That is, it is important to note that
the starting place for talk of dispositions begins at the point of our experience of the world. It is
important because it sometimes does appear that there is a kind of circularity to the world.
When one studies the morphology of animals, for example, one notices what are call
homologous structures that are, simply, shared structures between species. Humans, cats, whales,
and bats all have the following bone structure for arms and legs: phalanges, metacarpals, carpals,
radius and ulna, and a humerus. In humans and monkeys, the phalanges are the bones that form
the fingers. The metacarpals are the bones that come between the wrist and the fingers, the
carpals are the bones that make up the wrist, the radius and ulna bones are those of the forearm,
and the humerus is the large bone of the upper arm. Now, whereas monkeys and humans use
their phalanges in similar ways, whales and cats do not. Similarly, whereas whales and bats use
their phalanges in similar ways, humans and cats do not. And so on. The point here is to notice
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that there is in nature a seeming cyclical use of structures. Nature relies on the structure that is
there and adapts it as necessary according to evolutionary pressures. This, it seems, is precisely
one kind of circularity that Mumford alludes to in his account of dispositions. On the one hand,
there is the circularity involved in the reuse of structure; on the other hand, there is the circularity
of the powers or dispositions that account for what it is that those various structures do and can
do. This is merely an initial sketch (and a brief one at that), but by thinking in terms of
homologous structures it might be possible to begin a sketch of dispositions that accounts for
circularity in the nature world – the world of experience.
But there are theoretical issues of circularity and regress as well. In Set Theory,
paradoxes arise when considering, for example, power sets (abbreviated here as P(s)) and subsets
of

infinite

sets.

For

instance,

for

the

set

{α, δ, ϕ} the

power

set

is

P(s){{},

{α}, {δ}, {ϕ}, {α, δ}, {α, ϕ}, {δ, ϕ}, {α, δ, ϕ}}. The paradox comes from the recognition that
power sets are cardinally higher than the set they represent as can be seen from the example just
given. But this is also true of infinite sets! In other words, given an infinite set {…, -1, 0, 1, …}
there is a power set that includes all subsets including the original set; but this would be a finite
set of an infinite set which seems absurd and, hence, paradoxical. However, non-wellfounded set
theory deals precisely with sets which contain themselves as members and, hence, accepts
circularity as fundamental. Perhaps, if the circularity and regresses found in the theory of
dispositions can be couched in terms of non-wellfounded set theory, then, especially given a
biological account as suggested above, there might be a way of providing a suitable account of
circularity and regress thereby lending the necessary theoretical support to dispositions. This is,
of course, highly speculative, but is nevertheless an area worth exploring.
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Finally, there is one issue that needs to be addressed. Throughout this thesis the concern
has been to focus on circularity and regress. Typically, it is not the regress that is a problem to
understand. As we saw earlier, if A is a disposition for B, and B for C, and C for D, and so on,
then it would seem that in either direction there would be some case for thinking that a regress
was be present. What is important, here, is that the problem of regress is fairly easy to see. It is
not so easy in the case of circularity. Circularity has been an issue and Bird and Mumford try to
overcome the objection. However, that circularity would, in fact, follow from a dispositional
account of things has never clearly been shown. I have followed along with Bird and Mumford
in the assumption that circularity would be a problem without explicating what this circularity
would look like (theoretically or empirically). I did this because even though no such account is
clearly given, it need not have been given in order to show that Bird’s and Mumford’s answers to
the supposed circularity/regress problem are inadequate. Nevertheless, a clear picture of the
nature of the circularity problem in dispositionalism must be articulated before the line of
investigation suggested above can continue.
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Notes

1. Bird, Alexander. 2007. Nature’s Metaphysics: Laws and Properties. Oxford: OUP. P. vii.
2. Turetzky, Philip. 1998. Time. London: Routledge. P. 65.
3. There is much literature on this. But see Copleston’s discussion: Ch. 47, “Scotus – III:
Metaphysics.” This position is very close to categoricalism which will be discussed in
more detail below.
4. For the following discussion, see Pierre Duhem’s excellent book Medieval Cosmology and his
discussions of John Duns Scotus throughout.
5. Ibid., p. 296.
6. Bird 2007, p. 67.
7. Mumford, Stephen. “Passing Powers Around.” The Monist (2009) 92:1; 94-111.
8. C.f., Molnar, George. 2003. Powers: a Study in Metaphysics. Oxford: OUP.
9. The terms “power” and “dispositions” are used synonymously. There are many words used
synonymously for “disposition”: power, property, potential, and so on – “power” is
Mumford’s preferred term. I shall try to use “power” for the sake of consistency, though
it will be necessary to refer to variant forms of “dispositions,” e.g., dispositionalism,
etc…
10. Bird 2007.
11. Stephen Mumford. 2004. Laws in Nature. London: Routledge.
12. Bird 2010. “Causation and the manifestation of powers.” In Powers. Their Grounding and
their Manifestations. Ed. Anna Marmodoro. London: Routledge.
13. Mumford, 2009. C.f., esp., Section 3. Properties and Causes. It has been suggested to me
that this line of reasoning is itself question begging since I am assuming that dispositions
do something in the first place in order to prove that dispositions are real. And were this
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actually the case, then I would agree. However, given the context of the account I am
trying to lay down, the examples of fire and poison are assumed to be the kinds of things
that dispositions would be; I am not claiming that they are. While the argument is perhaps
ad hoc, it is not question begging. The point is to bring to the forefront the importance of
causal reality.
14. Mumford 2009.
15. Ibid.
16. Armstrong, David. “Four disputes about properties.” Synthese (2005) 144; 309-320. In
Mumford 2009.
17. Mumford 2009
18. Bird 2010.
19. Ibid.
20. By “primitive” I mean something like ontologically irreducible. Bird’s use of the term speaks
of the categoricalist position where a property is intrinsic and, thus, contingent.
Nevertheless, the S-M-D relationship is what constitutes the world and in this context my
use of the word “primitive” is consistent with Bird’s position. See p. 44 of Bird’s 2007,
for example.
21. Bird 2007, pp. 190-191.
22. Ibid., p. 78. C.f. pp. 76-79 & 100-104.
23. Ibid., p. 189.
24. Ibid., p. 192.
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25. Ibid., p. 193. “(IV) Laws must add something to nature such that the world would be
significantly different were they not there. According to the realist position, a world that
lacked laws would be a very different world from ours.” C.f., esp., Mumford 2004, p. 145
26. Ibid., pp. 193-194.
27. Ibid., p. 196.
28. Ibid., p. 139.
29. 2004.
30. Ibid., pp. 4-7.
31. Bird 2007, pp. 136-137.
32. Ibid., p. 136.
33. Ibid., p. 137.
34. C.f., note 20 above.
35. Bird 2007, p. 146.
36. Jaegwon Kim. Mind in a Physical World. MIT Press: Mass. (1997). P. 14. See also: John
Symons. “Supervenience.” in Encyclopedic Reference of Neuroscience. New York:
Springer, 2008. And Brian McLaughlin & Karen Bennett’s “Supervenience.” Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2005) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/supervenience/#3.6
37. Bird 2010.
38. Bird 2007, p. 38.
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